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PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
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At common law, certain extraordinary corporate changes' could
be made only with the unanimous approval or acquiesence of all
shareholders.' Each shareholder thus had, in effect, a veto power over
these extraordinary changes. This rule was based on the theory that
the shareholder had invested in a continuing enterprise which should
not be fundamentally altered against his will." Otherwise, it was
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Staid, Car o lina School of Law.
The various corporate actions which are viewed as fundamental or extraordi-
nary normally include:
(a) a merger or consolidation;
(b) a sale or exchange of property and assets, not in the usual and regu-
lar course of business, For a consideration other than cash; or
(c) an amendment to the articles of incorporation, particularly changes in
the corporate purposes, extension of corporate life, reduction or the
number of directors, change in the corporate financial structure or in the
rights of shareholders.
See, e.g. H. HENN. LA " OF CORPORXr IONS, 694, 697-98 (2d ed. 1970).
2 E.g., Voeller v. Neilston Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (194 I); Geddes v. Anaconda
Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1921); Lanni, Remedies of Dissenting Stockhold-
ers Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HA Ity. L. RE". 233, 234 (1931) [hereinafter Lanin]; Levy,
Rights qf Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 Coasata. L.Q. 420 (1930)
[hereinafter Levy].
See Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (Ch. 1934). where the
court stated that:
When a stockholder buys stock it is to be supposed that he buys into
a corporation as a going concern. He does not buy on the theory that he is '
about to participate in a contemplated liquidadon of the corporation's as-
sets. He buys all aliquot share of a business, and he probably takes into ac-
count, or should at least take into account, not alone its present asset con-
dition and earning power but as well its future prospects as a continuing
enterprise. When a merger proposal is put through with which he chooses
to dissociate himself, he is forced out of his investinent and compelled to
abandon his association with a business of which he was a part owner. As
to him, the going concern is done. Others have decreed its cessation
against his will.
Id. at 149-50, 172 A. at 455.
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thought, his corporate investment would be subject to unreasonable
risk after initial capital commitment. 4 In practice, however, this strict
rule hindered otherwise legitimate corporate activities and, as a result,
modern statutes were adopted in fifty states and the District of
Columbian which took this veto power from the individual sharehold-
4 Id.
`ALA. CODE Lit. 10, §§ 21 (62), 21 (73) (Cum. Supp. 1974): ALASKA STAT. **
10.05.426, 10.05.456 (1974); ARIL. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-347. 10-363 (1956); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 64-707, 64-804 (1966); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 4300 (West Stipp. 1975), 5007 (West
1955); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-5-13, 31-7-8 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
33-373, 33-374 (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1975); D.C. CODE ENCVCL.
ANN. § 29-927i (1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608-23 (Supp. 1975-76); GA. CODE ANN. §
22-120 (1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 417-19 to 417-22 (1968), 417-23 (Supp. 1974),
417-24 to 417-30 (1968); loArlo CODE §§ 30-150, 30-156 (1967); 1u.. ANN. STAT. ch . 32,
** 157.70, 157.73 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975-76); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 23-1-5-7. 23-1-6-5
(Burns 1972); lowA CODE ANN. §§ 496A.77, 496A.78 (1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
17-6703(d), 17-6712 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27IA.405 (Baldwin 1973); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12:131 (West Stipp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I3-A, § 909 (1974);
Mu. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 73 (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B ** 76, 77, 82(e), 83(1), 85
(1970), 86-89 (Supp. 1975), 88-98 (1973); MIDI. STAT. ANN. 450.1763-450.1771 (1974);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 301.40, 301.44 (1969); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 5309-171, 5309-172
(Cum. Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.** 351.405, 351.455 (Vernon 1966); MoNT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 15-2273, 15,2274 (1967); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2079, 21-2080 (1970);
NEV. REV. STAT.** 78.505, 78.507, 78.510, 78.515, 78.520, 78.521 (1973); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 294:76-294:80 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANC §§ 14A.I I-I to 14A.11-3 (Supp.
1975-76), 14A.I 1-4, 14A.II-5 (1970), 14A.11-6 (Supp. 1975-76), 14A.I 1-7 to I4A.11-11
(1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-28-3, 51-28-4 (Supp. 1973) N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623
(Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-20-08, 10-20-11
( 1960); 01410 REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.84-85 (1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, **
1 . 157 -. 161 ( 1953); ORE. REV. STAT.** 57,432, 57.437, 57.442, 57.445 (1974); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1515 (Supp. 1974-75); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 7-1.1-73, 7-1.1-74 (1970);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.27 (Cum. Supp. 1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-6-23 to
47-6-39 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48.909-48. 916 (Supp. 1974); TEN. Bus. CORP. Acr
ANN. ans. 5.11-5.13 (Supp. 1974-75); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-10-75, 16-10-76 (1973);
VT. STAT. ANN. lit. I I, §§ 2003-2004 (Cum. Supp. 1972); "A. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-75,
13.1-76, 13.1-78 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23A.24.030, 23A.24.040
(1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-122, 31-1-123 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
180.72 (Supp. 1974-75); Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-36-71, 17-36-72 (1965).
Some states provide, however, that unless the certificate of incorporation pro-
vides otherwise, statutory appraisal is unavailable if the shares are listed on a national
securities exchange, e.g.. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (1975); NEV, REV. STAT.* 78.521
(1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-75 (1973), or are held by more than a specified
number of owners, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-131(13)(3) (1969), Mu:11.3 .AT. ANN. § 450.1762 (1974). Thus, while appraisal is pro-
vided, it exists in these jurisdictions for only the small, closely-held enterprise or a
slightly larger counterpart: the over-the-counter company. Shareholders in listed com-
panies are precluded from appraisal, even though the market value of their interest
may be decreased due to the very action to which they object. This is the case because
the market prices of the shares so listed will reflect the market place evaluation or the
proposed corporate change almost immediately upon its announcement. See Manning,
The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 231 -39
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Manning].
Delaware has an interesting statutory scheme for appraisal. Title 8, § 262, the
major provision for appraisal, is limited to merger and consolidation actions. Other sec-
tions cover appraisal in conjunction with other corporate changes: * 251—short-form
mergers, § 253—parent-subsidiary mergers, § 271—sale of assets and § 303—Federal
2
APPRAISAL RIGHTS
er and substituted in its place the appraisal remedy." Under the ap-
praisal remedy, a dissenting stockholder has the right to demand, in
exchange for his corporate interest, the actual value of his capital in-
vestment in a corporation upon the occurrence of a fundamental cor-
porate change.? Shareholders thus have the option of either remain-
ing in We enterprise or refusing to participate in the new venture." If
the latter alternative is selected, the shareholder will receive, in cash,
the value of his stock, neither enhanced nor encumbered by the
proposed corporate action." In sum, the appraisal statutes recognize
the desirability of allowing corporate flexibility and mesh with other
liberal state statutes which allow the corporation to grow, both exter-
nally and internally, with a minimum of legal restrictions." The ap-
praisal statutes also prevent injustice to minority shareholders by tak-
ing cognizance of the inherent right of a shareholder to object to
fundamental corporate changes in a manner which protects his capital
investment."
Predictably, the major question in most appraisal proceedings is
the dollar valuation of the dissenter's stock holding. The market value
cannot be used since the price of the shares will be affected by the act
triggering the appraisal. Furthermore, in the case of some shares,
there is no market. Techniques and guidelines have thus evolved,
both judicially and statutorily, for determining the value of the
holding." The statutory procedures normally require that, within a
prescribed period after the occurrence of the act for which the ap-
praisal is sought, the dissenting shareholder must notify the corpora-
tion of his election to have his shares "bought out."' 3 In many juris-
reorganizations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §1 262, 251, 271, 303 (1975).
For a general discussion of statutory appraisal rights, see Manning, supra, at
239 -260; Skolar, Some Observations on the Scope of Appraisal Statutes, 13 Bus. LAW. 240
(1 958). An earlier viewpoint is reflected in Levy, supra note 2.
° Voeller v. Neilston Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941); e.g., Lattin, supra note 2,
at 237; Levy, supra note 2 at 420-21. These enactments are listed in note 5 supra.
'The appraisal statutes provide that the value of the dissenter's shares shall be
determined as of a particular date, usually the day before the vote authorizing the cor-
porate action, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 12:131(E) (West Supp. 1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAIN § 623(h) (4) (Supp. 1975); the day of the vote, e.g., ARIZ. REV. SEAT. ANN. 10-347
(1956); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23 § 73 (1973); or the effective date of the transaction, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1975).
" Appraisal as the exclusive remedy invoked in cases where fundamental corpo-
rate change is undertaken is generally the rule, However, in certain instances injunctive
relief is available to prevent such corporate action. E.g., Cole v. National Cash Credit
Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 56-57, 156 A. 183, 187-88 (1931) (inequitable treatment of
minority); Outwater v. Public Serv. Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 467-68, 143 A. 729, 732
(Ch.), affd, 104 N.J. Eq. 490, 146 A. 916 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929) (fraud); Wheatley v.
Al, Roof Co., 147 Ohio St. 127, 145, 69 N.E.2d 187, 196 (1946) (ultra vires activity).
9 E.g., Lattin, supra note 2 at 234.
'" See Note, 60 YAI.E L.J. 337, 337-38 (1951).
Voeller v. Neilston Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941).
"E.g., Application of Del. Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 413-25, 213 A.2d 203,
208-14 (Sup. Ct. 1965); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 262 (1975).
"E.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, 262 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORE. LAW 623 (Supp.
•
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dictions, the corporation must then, within a specified period, make
an offer for the shares." If the corporation and the dissenting
shareholder cannot agree as to the value of the shares, the dissenter
may then petition for court appraisal to determine the value of his
investment.' After what may be a lengthy"' evaluation by the court
or court-appointed appraisers," a value is determined for the shares
which the corporation is required to pay, and the shareholder is re-
quired to accept.'" Considerable delay, therefore, may transpire be-
fore the dissenting shareholder actually receives cash in payment for
his shares.'" This delay gives rise to a second major question which
has not yet been fully answered in all jurisdictions: Is the dissenting
stockholder entitled to receive interest on an appraisal award, and if
so, what are the specific details of the recovery? 2 "
This article will demonstrate that prejudgment interest on ap-
praisal awards is a necessary element in the equitable compensation of
a dissenting shareholder. It will be shown that in the absence of such
interest the appraisal award fa ils to represent the fair value of the
dissenter's corporate holding. In addition, it will be shown that a fail-
ure to award such interest allows the corporation to realize a windfhll
through the cost-free use of the dissenter's capital during the ap-
praisal period. Specifically, this article will examine several questions
regarding the payment of interest in appraisal actions. Should interest
on the award be required? If so, from what date, on what amount,
and at what rate should interest be computed? Should interest be
compounded? Who determines the interest award—the court or the
appraiser? Finally, statutory language will be suggested which, if
adopted, would have the effect of both providing for interest and
clarifying the details which surround an interest award.
I. SHOULD INTEREST ON THE APPRAISAL AWARD BE REQUIRED?
Most statutes originally made no provision for the awarding of
1975): OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1701.85 (1971).
E.g., CAI.. CORP. CODE § 4304 (West 1955); N.Y Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(g) (Stipp.
1974-75).
' 5 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1975).
" See Comment, I Sw. L. J. 207, 214-17 (1947).
17 The court may appoint appraisers to receive evidence and recommend a deci-
sion as to value. The court, however, is normally the final arbiter on this issue. See text
infra at notes 131-40.
'"E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(f) (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(h)
(1963).
'" See Continent, I Sw. L.J. 207, 214-17 (1947).
25 It is clear that after the appraisal judgement has been enrolled or entered by
the court, interest is payable in accordance with the relevant legal interest statute either
from a date specified by such judgment or from the date of entry. For example, N.Y.
CIV. New. 5003 (1963) provides: "Every money judgment shall bear interest from the
date of its entry. Every order directing the payment of money which has been docketed
as a judgment shall bear interest from the date of such docketing."
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interest in appraisal proceedings?' This statutory silence resulted in
diverse treatment of the interest issue by the state courts. Some courts
held that despite the absence of express statutory authorization, in-
terest could be awarded as a proper element of the appraisal
remedy." Most courts, however, emphasizing the statutory character
of the appraisal remedy, held that absent express statutory authority,
they were without power to award interest. 2" These decisions were
based on the theory that the legiSlative body, in recognizing the de-
sirability of allowing fundamental corporate change presumably had
considered, and therefore must have rejected, notions of the payment
of interest to one who would disrupt the enterprise by demanding a
return of his atpita1. 24
For example, at one time the Delaware appraisal statute did riot
provide for interest recovery25 and the courts of that state uniformly
held that the right of appraisal was a wholly statutory remedy whose
contours were defined exclusively by that statute. 2" In Mewl. v. Pacific
Gamble Robinson Co., 27 the court noted that the statute directed the
surviving corporation to pay„ within three months after the merger,
the value of the stock at the date of the merger." It was held that, in
the event that court appraisal was sought, the statutory silence with
respect to prejudgment interest meant that the appraisal amount was
collectible "as other debts are by law collectible" if payment were not
made within sixty days of the appraisal judgment. 2" The court there-
fore held that the corporation was entitled to a period of sixty days
from the date of the appraisal judgment before default in payment
thereof could occur." Thus, only after this sixty-day period had run
would interest be recoverable. 3 ' This result was based on the fact that
prior to the expiration of the sixty-day period, the corporation had
21 E.g., ch. 437 § 44 [1903] Mass. Acts and Resolves 438-39; ch. 787 ** 21, 87
[1923] Laws of N.Y. 1386, 1406. See Note, 37 VA. L. REV. 901 (1951),
" E.g., Skipwith v. Federal Water & Gas Corp., 185 Misc. 248, 252-54, 56
N.Y.S.2d 804, 806-08 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Craddock-Terry Co. v. Powell, 181 Va. 417, 457,
25 S.E.2d 363, 380 (1943).
22 Meade v, Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 30 Del. Ch. 509, 58 A.2d 415, 418
(Sup. Ct. 1948); In re Jassen Dairy Corp., 2 N.J. Super. 580, 586-88, 64 A.2d 652,
655-56 (1949 Law Div.); l'ittston Co. v. O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 900-01, 63 S.E.2d 34,
39-40 (1951).
" E.g., In re Jassen Dairy Corp., 2 N.J. Super. 580, 586-88. 64 A,2(1 652, 655-56
(1949).
25 35 Del. Laws ch. 85, § 20 (1927), as amended, 40 Del. Laws ch. 148, 8 (1937),
as amended, 43 Del. Laws ch. 132 § 16 (1943); see E. FOLK. THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW: A CONIMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 389 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Folk].
26 Meade v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 30 Del. Ch. 509, 58 A.2d 415 (Ch.
1948); In re General Realty & Util. Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6 (Ch. 1947).
" 30 Del, Ch. 509, 58 A.2d 415 (Ch. 1948).
25 Id. at 512, 58 A.2(1 at 416.
"Id. at 513, 58 A.2d at 417, construing 35 Del. Laws ch. 85, § 20 (1927), as
amended, 40 Del. Laws ch. 148, § 8 (1937), as amended, 43 Del. Laws ch. 132, § 16 (1943).
" 30 Del. Ch. at 514, 58 A.2d at 418.
Id. at 515, 58 A.2d at 418.
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violated no duty which it owed to the dissenting shareholder:
[T]he law action interest cases and also cases cited involving
mergers or sales of assets which were ultra vires or other-
wise illegal [are inapplicable]. Because of the absence of
provisions for interest in the statute and because the actual
provisions seem inconsistent with its allowance, we conclude
that the benefits afforded stockholders who do not wish to
go along with a merger do not include interest upon the
appraisers' award. 32
Similarly, the Maryland statute, 33 construed in American General
Corp. v. Camp," provided that the corporation was entitled to thirty
clays from the date of court confirmation of the appraiser's award be-
fore payment of the award was required. 35 After that period had ex-
pired, the statute provided that the amount of the award became a
decree against the corporation." In interpreting this statute, the court
noted that:
All the stockholder is entitled to receive is the value of his
stock as represented by the amount of the award. He is not
entitled to receive more in the form of interest until after
the expiration of the thirty day period, because the statute
expressly provides that the amount of the award shall be the
lien, which inferentially excludes any interest from accruing
during the .
 period before the amount of the award becomes
a decree. Since the stockholder has no enforceable right to
the money until the corporation has withheld or deprived
the stockholder of what is due him for thirty days after the
confirmation, there is no reason nor principle for interest
to he chargeable until the corporation is in default."
In some cases, a request for interest has been denied on the
theory that until appraisement is completed, the appraisal amount is
merely an unliquidated claim representing no definite sum upon
which interest may be calculated." Under this theory, the amount of
the debt for the dissenter's shares is not established until there is
either an acceptance of a settlement offer or a final judgment in the
appraisal proceeding. 3" The unliquidated sum theory was thus held to
preclude the recovery of interest during this interim period unless
"Id. at 514-15, 58 A.2d at 418.
" Ch. 551 §§ 35. 36 [1935] Laws of Md.
" 171 Md. 629, 190 A. 225 (1937).
" Ch. 551 §§ 35, 36 [1935] Laws of Md.
3° 171 Md. at 641, 190 A. at 230.
"Id. at 641-42, 190 A. at 230-31.
"E.g., American Gen. Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629, 190 A. 225 (1937); in re
Erlanger, 237 N.Y. 159, 142 N.E. 571 (1923).
"American General, 171 Md. at 641, 190 A. at 230; In re Erlanger, 237 N.Y. 159,
165-66, 142 N.E. 571, 573 (1923).
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such recovery was expressly provided for by statute. 4 °
This reasoning is not persuasive in light of the fact that courts
have frequently recognized the compensatory nature of interest re-
covery in other analogous types of actions where the amount of dam-
age was unliquidated. 41 In tort actions, interest may be properly
awarded if the plaintiff has suffered an injury to his pecuniary in-
terests resulting in distinct and measurable financial loss. 42 This is
true despite the fact that a dollar amount cannot be determined prior
to judgment." Similarly, in contract actions and other claims for
money due, interest has been recoverable as an element of damages. 44
Finally, appraisal actions can be analogized to eminent domain cases,
which require the accrual of interest from the time of property dis-
posal until the final payment of the award." These decisions directly
support the dissenting shareholder's claim for interest recovery de-
spite the fact that until appraisement is completed, the appraisal
award is unliquidated.
Most of the recent corporation statutes do expressly provide for
the inclusion of prejudgment interest on appraisal awards. Twenty-
three states," as well as the Model Business Corporation Act,'" pro-
vide for interest and state that the payment of such interest shall be
either at an "equitable" or at a "fair and equitable" rate, set at the dis-
cretion of the court. Statutes of ten states provide, in seemingly man-
"American General, 171 Md. at 641, 190 A. at 230; In re Erlanger, 237 N.Y. 159,
165-66, 142 N.E. 571, 573 (1923).
"See, e.g., Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Elk Ref. Co., 186 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1950)
(tort); Betzer v. Olney, 14 Cal. App. 2d 53, 57 P.2d 1376 (Dist. Ct. of App. 1936) (con-
tract); Fell v. Union Par. Ry., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003 (1907) (tort).
42 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES, § 56 at 222-223 (1935).
"Id.
44 E.g., Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 258 (1924); Spalding v. Mason, 161
U.S. 375, 395 (1896); Curtis v. Innerarity, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 146, 154 (1848).
45 E.g., State v. Painter, 120 W. Va. 846, 199 S.E, 372 (1938).
" CONN. GEN. SEAT. ANN. §§ 33-374 (Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1202
(1970); Kv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27!A,405 (Baldwin 1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I3-A, §
909 (1974); MICH. STAT. ANN. 450.1768 (1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5039-171 (Cum,
Supp. 1972); MONT. REV. Cones ANN. 15-2274 (1967); N.J. Styr. ANN. § 14A.1 1-9
(1969); N.M. Styr. ANN. § 51-28-4 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Bus. CORP, LAW. § 623 (Supp.
1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85 (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. * 57.445 (1974); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 1515 (Supp. 1974-75); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-74 (1970); S.0
CODE ANN. § 12-16-27 (Cum. Supp. 1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-6-24 (1967);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-76 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. fit. 1 1, 2004 (Cum. Supp. 1972);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-75, 13.1-78 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.24.040
(1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-123 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.72
(Supp. 1974-75); Wyo. Stkr. ANN. § 17-36-72 (1965).
Three states have not incorporated the word "equitable" into their interest provi-
sions, yet it would appear that such a standard is implied. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §262
(1975); RAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6712(h) (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. I56B 95 (1970).
For example, Delaware provides for the payment of interest to di'ssenters as follows:
"The Court may, on application of any party in interest, determine the amount of in-
terest, if any, to be paid upon the value of the stock of the stockholders entitled
thereto." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,11 262(h) (1975). •
47 ABA-A LI Moon. Bus. CORP. Acr § 81 (1974).
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datory language, that the appraisal award shall be the value "together
with interest thereon to date of judgment" or "plus interest." 48 Sta-
tutes of four jurisdictions expressly set the rate of interest. 49 Eight
states have no interest provision at- al1. 5 ° No statutes, however, have
been construed to require payment of interest on appraisal awards in
all cases.
These statutes have, in many instances, been interpreted liber-
ally. In Manning v. Brandon Corp.," the South Carolina Supreme
Court was called upon to apply that state's interest provision." The
court noted that the appraisal statute "gives the consolidated corpora-
tion one of the highest rights known to the law, that of taking the
property of a stockholder over his objection .... This statute should
be construed liberally in favor of the stockholder, so as to carry out
the manifest theory of the act ... . "53
The Delaware interest provision, 54 adopted to overcome the re-
straints perceived in that state's prior appraisal statute," has also been
construed liberally. In Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.," the court
noted that "since the corporation has had the use of the dissenting
stockholders' 'money' from the date of the merger ... interest should
generally be allowed as a matter of course." 57 In Felder, the corpora-
tion had offered $395 per share while the stockholders had de-
manded $1,000 per share. The appraised value was $432.09 pèr
share. 58 The court found it not unusual that the stockholders had
proffered an exaggerated view of the value of their stock, and that
they were not attempting to force an extortionate settlement by abuse
of the appraisal process, a process which a dissenter has every right to
111 ALA.. CODE tit. 10, §§ 21(62), 21 (73) (Cum. Supp. 1974); AI.ASKA STAT. §§
10.05.426, 10.05.456 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-707, 64-804 (1966); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 31-5-13, 31-7-8 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 32 §§ 157.70, 157.73 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1975-76); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.405 (Vernon 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
55-113 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-20-08, 10-20-11 (1960); TENN. CODE ANN. §
48.915 (Stipp. 1974); TEX. Bus. CORI'. ACT ANN. art. 512 (Supp. 1974-75). Although
Louisiana and Oklahoma do not expressly provide for interest, they do so by implica-
tion. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:131(G) (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.159
(1953).
'" HAwAii REV. &rm.. 417-25 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.78 (1962); NEB.
REV.STAT. § 21-2080 (1970); D.C. CODE ENCECL. ANN. § 29-9271(c) (1966).
so
	 REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-347, 10-363 (1956); CAL. CORP. CODE § 4311
(1955); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.23 (Supp. 1975-76); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-150, 30-156
(1967); Igo. ANN. STAT. §§ 23-1-5-7, 23-1-6-5 (Burns 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.40
(1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.510 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294:76 (1966).
51 163 S.C. 178, 161 S.E. 405 (1931).
32 Act of April 14, 1925, 34 Laws of S.C. 246.
33 163 S.C. at 186, 161 S.E. at 408.
" DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1975) provides in pertinent pan: "The Court
may, on application of any party in interest, determine the amount of interest, if any, to
be paid upon the value of the stock ...."
IS See text at notes 25-32 supra.
°° 39 Del. Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278 (Ch. 1960).
52 Id. at 89, 159 A.2d at 286.
58 Id. at 90, 159 A.2d at 286.
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invoke." Since the appraised value exceeded the corporation's highest
cash offer, the court concluded that. it. could exercise its discretion and
either grant. or deny interest." This decision was controlled by the
fact that the company had had the unrestricted use of the stockhold-
ers"money' during the period. of the appraisal." 61 "Interest," the
court. reasoned, "really represents damages for the delay in payment
and compensation for the use of plaintiffs' money. ”62
There are limits to the liberal attitude of the courts in interpret-
ing the recent appraisal statutes, however. This was demon-
strztted in Loeb v. Schenley Industries, Inc.," where the Delaware court
rejected a motion by the shareholders to require the corporation to
pay a minimum value either agreed to by the parties or stipulated by
the court for the purpose of reducing the amount of interest for
which the corporation ultimately would be liable at the completion of
the appraisal proceedings. 04 The dissenters, owning less than live per-
cent of the stock of Schenley Industries, objected to a merger of that
corporation into a subsidiary of Glen Alden which held substantially
all of the Schenley shares."' The shareholders petitioned the court for
partial stunmary judgment to set a value which they claimed was un-
controverted on the present record and to fix thereafter the
minimum value for their shares."" The summary judgtnent would also
have ordered payment of such value pending adjustment resulting
from the formal appraisal, which, presumably, would result in addi-
tional compensation for surrender of their shareholder status." 7 The
court concluded that the provisions of Delaware law provided an or-
derly method for withdrawal from a corporation by shareholders who
dissent and that this method was neither unfair nor partial."" Noting
that the statute was an exclusive remedy, the court stated that:
No basis exists in either the statute itself or in the case
law construing such statute for such an abridgment of the
50 Id .
"" Id.
1,1
62 Id, tt 92, 159 A.2d at 287; acrord, Swanton v. State Guar. Corp., 42 Dcl. Ch.
477, 485-86, 215 A.2d 242, 247 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc.,
35 Del. Ch. 560, 571, 123 A.2d 121, 127 (Ch. 1956).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in interpreting its state's interest provision,
PA. Seive. ANN. tit. 15, 4 1515 (Supp. 1974-75), noted that:
the better view, as well as the intent of the statute, is to allow interest its a
matter of course in all cases absent the existence of some inequitable situa-
tion. "Since the corporation has had the Inc of the dissenter's money with-
out his consent from the time he demanded appraisal, it seems that in-
terest is justified."
O'Connor Appeal, 452 Pa. 287, 298, 304 A.2d 694, 701 (1973).
" 285 A.2d 829 (Del. Ch. 1971).
"M. at 830-31.
" ht. at 851 n.l.
"Id. at 830.
" 7 Id.
"" Id.
9
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duties of appraisal conferred on the appraiser and the
Court.... [T]he right to an appraisal in a merger proceed-
ing is entirely a creature of statute. Petitioners having cho-
sen such course of action, they are remitted in the interim
to their right to interest, the unfair procedure which for-
merly denied objecting stockholders their right to interest
pending appraisal having been remedied by statute.""
The plaintiffs in Loeb had also contended that their motion for
partial summary ,
 judgment should be granted because the surviving
corporation had taken action which threatened its financial security,
and hence, its ability to ultimately satisfy the appraisal award." The
court noted that these charges of financial insecurity were purely con-
jectural and that it was highly unlikely that the surviving corporation
would act to undermine its assets to the extent that it would be unable
to pay the value of less than five percent of the stock!' lf, however, a
dissenter can demonstrate that there are substantial problems regard-
ing the solvency of the enterprise which is obligated to pay him, it is
suggested that the partial summary judgment route may be desirable.
Loeb only found this argument inapplicable; it did not reject it. 72
It is riot the position of the corporation codes that a court may
never, in its discretion, deny the payment of interest on an appraisal
award. 7 " Such a discretionary denial could be based on two rationales.
First, any return on the dissenting shareholder's investment should be
limited to that amount which represents a "normal" corporate divi-
dend. Since a corporation's dividend rate may be considerably less
than the rate paid by the corporation on borrowed funds, this limita-
tion would avoid giving the dissenter, when compared to other
shareholders, a disproportionate reward for the use of his money
which was earmarked for corporate activities. This limitation also rec-
ognizes the differences between income and growth investments—a
factor which should enter into the valuation of a dissenter's invest-
ment. For example, if the corporation has habitually paid no div-
idends, or only very minimal dividends, in comparison to earnings,
the retained earnings probably have been reinvested in the corpora-
tion resulting in higher compound earnings. This reinvestment and its
impact upon future earnings already may have been taken into ac-
count by the court in the computation of the value of the dissenter's
shares. To this extent, additional compensation in the form of interest
should not be granted, even though this treatment may not recognize
the true creditor status of a dissenting shareholder. Put simply, in-
terest recovery may be disallowed where the judicial valuation has
"" Id. at 831.
n' Id.
71 Id.
"Id.
"E.g., DEE.. Cone ANN. dt. 8 262(h) (1975).
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taken into account the future growth of the investment during the
appraisal period.
Second, some states require the court to disallow interest if the
shareholder's rejection of the corporation's settlement offer was "ar-
bitrary" or "vexatibus." 74 Such statutes recognize that. as to a bona fide
claimant, the appraisal process is appropriate, but that dissenters
should not threaten an intensive probe of corporate records in order
to blackmail the corporation into an exorbitant settlement to avoid
bothersome and costly appraisal proceedings."
The Model Act provides only that the judgment shall include in-
terest "at. such rate as the court may find to be fair and equitable in
all the circumstances."" However, the Act provides in the next para-
graph for the assessment of the costs and expenses of any appraisal
proceeding as the court "may deem equitable against any or all of the
dissenting shareholders ... if the court shall find that the action of
such shareholder in failing to accept [the corporation's settlement]
offer was arbitrary or vexatious or not in good faith." 77 The fact. that
this "arbitrary or vexatious" phrase has been omitted from the interest
paragraph may persuade some judicial interpreters to conclude that
the draftsmen of the Model Act did not intend to vest discretion in
the courts to refuse, in toto, the awarding of interest. It appears,
however, that the better view would be to allow such a refusal based
upon the "fair and equitable" language contained in the interest pro-
vision. Clearly, an arbitrary or vexatious rejection of the initial corpo-
rate offer could be the basis for a court finding that a "fair and equit-
able" rate of interest was zero.
Either of the above rationales may lead a court to conclude that
an award of interest would be inappropriate. This would probably
occur upon a motion by the corporation to disallow the shareholder's
request for interest. In the absence of these discretionary factors, in-
terest should be awarded in appraisal proceedings. The shareholder
has committed his investment fund to a corporation for the purpose
of earning a return. Since most jurisdictions statutorily terminate div-
idends and other incidents of corporate ownership upon the
dissenter's filing of his demand for payment," interest recovery is
"GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1202 (1970); ME, REV. STAT. ANN. lit. 13-A, § 909(G)
(1974); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 73 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § (1909); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 623 (Supp. 1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.270)(6) (Cum. Stipp. 1974);
TENN. Com,. ANN. § 48.915 (Supp. 1975).
"See, e.g., Application of Deutchmann, III N.Y.S.2d 140. alp, 279 App. Div.
642, 107 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1951); Marcus v. R.H. Macy & Co., 297 N.Y. 38, 74 N.E.2d
228 (1947).
ABA -AL1 MODEL BO. CORP. ACT § 81 (1974).
"
78 E.g., DEL, CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(i) (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:131(H)
(1969); MAss. GEN. LAWS Cll. I56B § 96 (1973); N.Y. Bus. Ow. LAw. § 623(e) (1963).
Between the time of demand and final payment, the skickholder may he in
limbo—a stockholder in name only with none of the ordinary incidents or rights of
such ownership. See Johnson v. Baldwin, 221 S.C. 141, 158, 69 S.E.2d 585, 593 (1952),
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necessary if the shareholder is not to be cut off from all return on his
investment. Jurisdictions which fail to award interest ignore this pro-
prietary nature of the dissenting shareholder's investment. If he is al-
lowed no return, then his capital is sterilized and his investment, as an
investment, is worthless. The result is that even large stockholders, al-
though able to absorb the costs of appraisal proceedings, may find
that the loss of investment income either forces a sale or necessitates
acquiescence in the corporate action. If he chooses to sell in the open
market, assuming there is a market for the stock, the dissenter might
receive a price considerably less than the book or appraisal value of
the shares, due to the nature of the industry or of the particular cor-
poration, the market conditions, or the block of stock being traded.
Just compensation, the avowed policy of the appraisal remedy," is not
accomplished where the only available procedure results in the stagna-
tion of capital.
In addition, money awarded years after the filing of a dissent is
clearly not equivalent to recovery at the time of the dissent. Full com-
pensation demands that account be taken of the period between the
dissent and the payment of the appraisal amount. In effect, there
must be a recognition of the "time value" of money in any determina-
tion of fair and equitable compensation. 8 °
Finally, it is clearly inequitable for the corporation to retain,
cost-free, the dissenter's invested funds during the period of the ap-
praisal proceeding. It is suggested that the allowance of such a reten-
tion encourages the corporation to make a tender of payment, or set-
dement offer, in an amount much less than the stock's fair value for
the purpose of retaining, at no cost, the dissenter's capital contribu-
tion for the lengthy appraisal period." Therefore, in accordance with
fairness, equity, and the statutory purpose of appraisal statutes, the
courts must recognize the dissenter's ownership rights in the invest-
ment fund which is to be valued, and provide a return on this value
in the form of an interest award.
II. FROM WHAT' DATE SHOULD LVTEREST BE COMPUTED?
In most jurisdictions, the dissenting shareholder who elects the
appraisal remedy forfeits all rights incident to equity ownership 82 and,
where a derivative suit brought by a stockholder alleging director mismanagement was
dismissed on the ground that, after demand for payment, the dissenter had ceased to
be a stockholder and thus did not have the requisite standing to sue.
"See text at notes I-10 supra.
"o E.g., Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 92, 159 A.2d 278, 287
(Ch. 1960).
"' However, while the appraisal process has sonic impact in this regard, the
avoidance of detailed examination of corporate books and records, possible liability for
costs, appraiser's and attorney's fees, and possible adverse effects on the market prices
of its securities due to unwelcome publicity may all also bear on the corporation's deci-
sion regarding the desirability and amount of its initial offer for a dissenter's shares.
8 2 See statutes cited in note 78 supra.
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in effect, appears to become a creditor of the corporation entitled to
the appraised value of his shares plus interest." 3 The appraisal statute
should thus specify , the precise date at which the dissenter's status as a
shareholder terminates and his status as a creditor begins. This ntay
be accomplished by clearly defining the date on which interest on the
appraisal award begins to accrue. A clear definition is necessary to en-
sure that the dissenter is provided with a fair return on his corporate
investment. If there is a lapse in the transition from shareholder to
creditor, the dissenter is denied interest as well as dividend distribu-
tion. His capital is thus sterilized and his investment made worthless.
Conversely, if there is an overlap in the transition from shareholder
to creditor, the dissenting shareholder receives interest as well as div-
idends, thus realizing a windfall at the expense of the corporation."
" 3
 See Note, 21 VA. REV. 825, 826-27 (1935). Creditor status would protect the
dissenter in the event the corporation became insolvent during the appraisal. It is not
clear under the current appraisal statutes, however, whether the shareholder beCOMCS a
general creditor 01 the corporation, sharing with all other creditors in any distribution
of assets upon liquidation. It is arguable that the shareholder making demand should
thereafter be granted only a prior position to all other holders of the same class and
series of stock. This would place him in priority to those shareholders who have ap-
proved the corporate action, which may have contributed to the insolvency, but subor-
dinates him to other corporate creditors. Otherwise, he is subject to the risk of losing
the value of his shares or will be required to share equally in liquidation with all other
shareholders who have approved the action to which he dissents.
84 In an unreported New York case, Ames v. Godchaux Sugars Inc., (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. filed Jan. 15, 1930). affd, 228 App. Div. 801, 239 N.Y.S. 917 (1930), noted in 32
COLUM. L. Rcv. 60 (1931), the court noted:
- If the statute permitted interest to run from [the date changes were
made), the date as of which the appraisal was made, the situation would be
comparatively simple. In that event, it could not very well be argued that
the dissenting shareholders should he entitled to both interest and div-
idends. The fact that the award draws no interest between [the date
changes were made in the cumulative rights of preferred stock) and the
date of confirmation would seetn to lend considerable weight to (the
dissenters') argument that the benefits received by other stockholders
should be participated in by them until the award is
32 CoI.UM. L. REV.. supra at 63-64; ty: Martignette v. Sagamore Mfg, Co., 340 Mass. 136,
143, 163 N.E.2d 9. 13 (1959).
If the dissenter is entitled to dividends in lieu of' interest during the period of
appraisal, it is necessary, however, to distinguish distributions which are allocable to
earnings accrued prior to the dissent, from those which were accrued alter the dissent.
If distributions are to be paid out of surplus which existed prior to the dissent, the dis-
senting shareholder should not be entitled to them since this surplus will be considered
in computing the value of the dissenter's holding. See note 7 supra. See also Robinson,
Dissenting Shareholders: Their Right to Dividends and the Valuation of Their Shares, 32
COLUM. L. REV. 60, 62-66 (1932); Note, 21 VA. L. Rev. 825, 827-28 (1935). However, if
dividends are paid out of earnings accrued subsequent to the dissent, the dissenter
should be entitled to share in these later profits since the corporation has had the use
of his funds, which were invested at risk in the enterprise. While it can he argued that
"'because the value of [the dissenter's) stock is fixed as of the date of his dissent , .. he
cannot share in subsequent profits or be charged with subsequent losses,'" Allies v,
Godchaux Sugars Inc., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 15, 1930), affd, 228 App. Div. 801, 239
N.Y.S. 917 (1930), noted in 32 Cokum. L. Rev. 60, 63-64 (1931), the fact that his funds
have been used by the corporation, subjecting him to possible loss, mandates compensa-
tion.
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The Model Act" 5 and statutes of several states" provide that in-
terest shall accrue from either day of or the day before the ap-
proval of the proposed corporate action. Other statutes provide differ-
ent dates" or are silents" as to the time span for interest computation.
Delaware, for example, does not provide specifically for the date on
which interest begins to accrue."
Statutes which expressly define the accrual period are desirable
because they leave little room for confusion. One date which lends it-
self to a bright-line test is the date on which the majority votes on the
proposed corporate change. Similarly clear is the date on which the
merger or other agreement is filed." The utilization of these dates
not only results in the uniform treatment of all dissenters, but also
facilitates corporate and judicial determinations regarding the period
of accrual. For these reasons, the suggested dates are clearly prefer-
able to the date on which the individual gave notice of election to dis-
sent, a date which may be subject to dispute.
One group of statutes provides that interest shall be recoverable
from a date fixed by the court." These statutes provide no guidance
to either the corporation or the dissenting shareholder. Furthermore,
complete discretion to take into account such factors as whether the
suit was brought for purposes of harassment or whether the dissent-
ing shareholder has failed to accept a fair and reasonable corporate
settlement offer is unnecessary in fixing the accrual period, where the
court has the power to set the rate of interest at a "fair and equitable"
rate." It is in the exercise of this power to determine a "fair and
equitable" rate that the court should more appropriately scrutinize the
bona fides of the dissenter's pursuit of the appraisal remedy.
If the specific language of the Model Act" was adopted in all
states, there would be little confusion regarding the period of interest
accrual on appraisal awards." This has not been done, however, and
14 ' ABA-A1.1 MODEL Bus. CORK Aar § 81 (1974) provides in pertinent part that:
"The judgment shall include an allowance for interest at such rate as the court may
find to be fair and equitable in all the circumstances, from the date on which the vote
was taken on the proposed corporate action to the date of payment."
80 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, §§ 21(62), 21(73) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (day before vote);
N.Y. Bus. Com ,. LAW § 623 (Supp. 1975) (day of vote).
"'E.g., HAIA'AII REV. STAT. § 417-25 (1968) (upon filing of merger agreement);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48.915 (Supp. 1974) (upon expiration of demand period).
89 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6712 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515 (Supp.
1974-75).
89 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1975).
90 E.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417-25 (1968).
"E.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85
(1971).
" jurisdictions which provide for interest at a fair and equitable rate are listed in
note 46 supra.
93 See note 85 supra.
"But see Goldberg v. Arrow Electronics, Inc., 42 A.D.2d 890, 347 N.Y.S.2d 597
(1973), where it was argued by the dissenter that interest should accrue on the value of
his shares from the date of the shareholder vote authorizing the plan of merger to the
14
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as a result, at the present time, there is in many states serious and
needless uncertainty over determination of the appraisal period.
III. ON WHAT AMOUNT SHOULD INTEREST BE COMPUTED?
The alternatives available to the court in determining the
amount upon which interest should be computed are limited. Prior to
the (late of judgment there are usually two ascertainable "values"
upon which interest might be computed: the corporation's settlement
offer and the shareholder's counter offer. Clearly, neither of these
amounts will necessarily be equivalent to the subsequent appraised
worth of the dissenter's corporate interest. Despite the fact that it re-
mains an unliquidated amount during the appraisal process,"" this lat-
ter sum should be the basis of the interest computation since it rep-
resents the amount of capital retained by the corporation.
In Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,"" however, the corporation
argued that the interest award should be computed only upon the dif-
ference between its initial settlement offer and the final judgment in
the appraisal action."' The Delaware court rejected the argument,"
finding that such a position was unsupported by the Delaware
statute" which, like the Model Act'"" and some other appraisal
statutes,'" was silent on the issue.'" 2 Clearly, the acceptance of such
an argument would encourage a corporation to delay settlement, since
it would have the interest-free use of the major portion of the
dissenter's investment.'"
The accrual of interest upon the appraised value of the
dissenter's corporate holding must be distinguished from the accrual
of interest upon an award of costs, expenses, and attorney's and ex-
pert witness' fees. Since the awarding of these latter charges is gener-
ally discretionary,'" there is no right of recovery prior to the
date of the abandonment thereof Id. at 891, 347 N.Y.S
tute, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(h)(6) (1963), provided
amount of the award from the date of shareholder vote
the event the corporate change proposed was afterward
to award interest. 42 A.D.2t1 at 891, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
even statutes which appear clear may prove ambiguous.
"See text at notes 38-40 supra.
"6 39 Del. Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278 (Ch. 1960).
" 7 Irl. at 90, 159 A.2d at 286.
"8 Id.; accord, Vought v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co.
N.E.2d 332, 334 (1962).
99 DEL.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 2620) (1975).
' 00 ABA-ALI Montt Bus. Coat) ACT 81 (1974).
nu E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 623(h)(6) (1963).
102 39 Del. Ch. at 90, 159 A.2d at 286.
103 See Note, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1453, 1472 (1966)
Co., 89 Pa. D. & C. 75, 81 (C.P. 1954).
1 " 4 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1975); N
(1963).
.2d at 599. 'Fhe New York sta-
for mandatory interest on the
but was silent as to interest in
abandoned. The court refused
Thus, in an unusual situation,
, 117 Ohio App. 389, 392, 192
. But see Austin v. City Stores
.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 623(h)(7)
IS
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judgment.'" This situation is thus clearly distinguishable from the
payment of the fair value of the dissenter's shares, an obligation of
the company which immediately arises upon filing of the
shareholder's notice of dissent.
IV. AT WHAT RATE SHOULD INTEREST BE COMPUTED?
While statutes in a few jurisdictions expressly set rates which are
to be applied in all appraisal actions,'" most provide that interest
shall be computed at a rate which the court finds fair and equitable
considering all the circumstances.'" Delaware, for example, does not
fix the interest rate, the matter being left to judicial discretion.'° 8 This
absence of a definite statutory rate gives rise to the question of what
rate should be applied by the courts. Should the legal rate, the market
rate, or some other rate of interest be charged against the corporation
for its retention of the shareholder's investment?'" The trial court's
answer to this question is very important because the matter is within
the discretion of the court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent
an arbitrary or capricious determination."°
In confronting this problem, some courts have adopted the legal
105 E.g., Tome Land & Improvement Co., (NSL) v. Silva, 86 N.M. 87, 91, 519
F.2d 1024. 1028 (1973).
1 ° 6 See statutes listed in note 49 supra.
107 See statutes listed in note 46 supra.
100
	
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1975). In Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores,
Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121 (Ch. 1956), the Delaware court noted:
The parties disagree on the rate of interest to be allowed. No evi-
dence was presented to me as to the going rate of money during the
period involved. This obligation, as I read the statute, rested with the
stockholders. I do not believe the statute necessarily calls for the legal rate.
Otherwise, there would have been no purpose to the use of language
which appears to leave the matter open.
Id at 571, 123 A.2d at 127.
Professor Folk notes: "Under Delaware law, the court will not employ any arbitrary
presumption as to the interest rate [such as applying the legal or statutory rate], but will
seek to find a rate which will clearly compensate plaintiffs for the fact that they were
deprived of the use of their money." E. FOLK. THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS, 389-90 (1972).
106 The legal rate is set by statute and normally applies to unpaid judgments. See
e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 5003 (1963), the text of which is set forth at note 20 supra. It is
not the standard referred to in any of the appraisal statutes, but it is referred to in sev-
eral cases as a justification for the rate set. E.g., Brown v. 14edahrs-Q B & R, Inc., 185
N.W.2d 249, 259 (N.D. 1971). There is no relationship between the legal and market
rates of interest. For example, the legal rate in South Carolina has been 6% since 1932.
Prime rates of four to six month commercial borrowings of quality companies set by
U.S. banks have ranged from 3% to 12% from 1955 and did not meet or exceed 6%
until mid-1966, after which they again briefly dropped to below 5% before beginning
the spiral to 12% in 1974. See Federal Reserve Historical Chart Bk., Sept. 1971, Wall St. J.,
July 5, 1974 at 2, col. 2.
"'E.g., Tome Land & Improvement Co. v. Silva, 83 N.M. 549, 554, 494 P.2(1
962, 967 (1972); Lucas v. Pembroke Water Co., 205 Va. 84, 92, 135 S.E.2d 147, 152
(1964).
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rate, without examination of the Market rate."' However, once the
stockholder has dissented, he no longer has the rights of a stockhold-
er, and is normally without return on his invested capital. 12 For this
reason, the court should not be limited in its consideration to only the
prime or legal interest rates. In Felder, the Delaware court accepted
the "going money rate" as the proper rate for appraisal purposes, but
was confronted with the defendant corporation's proposition that that
rate should be construed to be what the corporation would receive as a
return on its invested capital, i.e.,' the 2.76% return on corporate
funds invested in short-term U.S. Treasury securities." 3 Concluding
that "interest really represents damages for the delay in payment and
compensation for the use of plaintiffs' money," 114 the court found
that the corporation's use of an average rate for government securities
was not appropriate to reimburse a dissenting stockholder for the loss
of the use of his money, since that 'return would have no "necessary
relationship to the damage resulting from the delay in payment."'"
However, the court also found that the dissenting shareholders were
seeking unrealistic interest at six percent, since at the time of the
litigation, 1960, money was available Eat rates substantially lower than six
percent even to an ordinary borrower at a hank. Furthermore,
reasonably safe investments at that time did not yield six percent.'"
Based on these factors, the court ultimately determined that a rate of
4.75% should he applied."'
In Speed v. Transamerica Corp.," 8
 a breach of fiduciary duty case,
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware applied
reasoning similar to that in Felder, and stated that courts should base
the prejudgment rate of interest on the compensatory character of the
award, rather than habitually apply the legal rate of interest:
Aside from contract interest setting the rate, or action in-
volving a Xtatutory rate, interest is not allowed, as such, but
is simply an incident of the .measure of the amount of
damage caused by delay in payment, which obviously de-
pends on the particular facts of each case. ... But there is
no statute or ruling fixing any particular rate to be allowed.
[The] determination of just compensation ... is for the
Court to fix upon the rate that it will allow. ... As early as
1914, state courts were departing from the 6% rate on pre-
"' E.g., Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B Sc R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 249, 259 (N.D. 1971).
1 " See text at note 78 supra.
'" 39 Del. Ch. at 91, 159 A.2d at 287.
14 /d. at 92, 159 A.2d at 287.
"5 1d.
"° Id. at 93, 159 A.2d at 288.
"'id. See also Swanton v. State Guar. Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 477, 485.86, 215 A.2d
242, 247 (Ch. 1965).
'" 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), modified, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
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judgment interest because it did not reflect the cost of
money .... I19
The court noted that the sole determining factor in interest computa-
tion is that the interest must compensate "the plaintiffs for the value
of the use of the principal withheld from them.' ,120
Over the last few years, several different rates have been applied
by the courts depending on the statutory rate, market rates and the
status of the participants in the appraisal process."' In these deci-
sions„the courts have also imposed a duty on the proponents to assist
the appraiser in its determination of the appropriate rate.'" The rate
applied should recognize the position of both the company as the bor-
rower and the dissenter as the lender; however, because the matter is
one which rests in the discretion of the court, the rate applied may be
greater than or less than the market rates. Consequently, it would be
wise for both the corporation and the shareholder to actively perform
their duties in assisting the appraiser by setting out the factors upon
which his discretion can be knowingly exercised. Not bound by either
side's presentation, the court would then examine the information
submitted, together with input from its own experts or appraisers, in
order to determine that rate of interest which a private lender in a
position similar to the dissenter would require on a loan of like mag-
nitude to the particular corporation.
In some cases this may be the commercial paper or prime rate.
However, if the company is not of such a stature as to appeal to in-
stitutional lenders, then rates of similar companies which borrow
funds on other short-term business loan arrangements with private
lenders should be used. For any of these borrowings, compensating
bank balances, collateral, line of credit and other charges, equity or
profit participation, etc. may be required. All raise the effective rate
of interest paid. These costs should be reflected in what the corpora-
tion pays for the dissenting shareholder's capital while continuing to
subject it to risk during the appraisal period. At the same time, an
owner of a small number of shares of minor value should not be al-
lowed interest recovery at the same rate as that paid on large loans.
For him, the savings account interest rate might constitute adequate
recovery.
Another factor which might be considered in determining the
proper rate of interest is the extent to which the fundamental corpo-
" 1 Id. at 199-200.
"' Id. at 201. Cf. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Lyles & Lang Constr. Co.,
219 F.2d 328. 342 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 956 (1955).
"'E.g., Swanton v. State Guar. Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 477, 486, 215 A.2d 242, 247
(Ch. 1965) (5%); Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121
(1956) (4%). Tome Land Improvement Co. v. Silva, 83 N.M. 549, 554, 494 P.2d 962,
967 (1972) (6%); Lucas v. Pembroke Water Co., 205 Va. 84, 92, 135 S.E.2d 147, 152
(1964) (2%).
"2 See Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 571, 123 A.2d
121, 127 (1956).
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rate change may subject the capital of the corporation to a greater
risk of loss. Through a merger, an acquisition, or an amendment of
the articles, a formerly conservative and staid corporation may be-
come dynamic, thus increasing the risk to which the capital is subject.
V. SHOULD INTEREST BE COMPOUNDED?
Assuming that the court has allowed interest,' 23 determined the
period of its accrual, 124 and set the rate at which it will be
computed,' 25 the court is still confronted with the question of whether
the interest rate should be simple or compound. Since most appraisal
statutes provide that interest is recoverable at a rate determined to be
fair and equitable,ng it is probably within the court's discretion to
compute the interest award on either a simple or a compound basis.
There is, however, no authority on this subject.'"
If the accrual period is short or the interest rate is low, the com-
pounding of interest is relatively unimportant. Where the period is
long and the rate is relatively high, the difference between using
compound and simple interest rates is significant. For example, if one
hundred dollars is invested for ten years at a rate of seven percent,
the yield would be $70 if the interest was not compounded and
$96.71 if compounded annually. Thus, the compounding of interest
would increase the yield by slightly over thirty-eight percent.
It is submitted that there are persuasive reasons in support of
the compounding of interest in appraisal proceedings. Interest is the
cost of using money—a rental charge for the use of the funds.
Where, as here, interest is not periodically paid out to the creditor, it
is necessary to take into account the retention of this accrued interest.
This amount is being used by the corporation during the pendency of'
the appraisal proceedings in the same manner as the principal is
being used. Hence, the corporation should also pay interest upon the
accrued amount.
In addition, in the absence of compound interest, the corpora-
tion could force the dissenter to sell his shares at less than fair value.
If the corporation initially makes a low settlement offer, lengthy ap-
praisal proceedings are inevitable. However, the allowance of only
simple interest on the appraisal award could, in some cases, result in a
situation where it would be more profitable for the shareholder to ac-
cept the settlement offer and invest the money in a savings account,
drawing interest compounded quarterly, rather than go through the
123 See Part I supra.
1 " See Part II supra.
I n See Part IV supra.
180 See note 46 supra.
1 " In Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), which in-
volved an alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the court concluded that compound interest
was a punitive device. Id. at 199. Because of the novelty of that litigation, such punitive
damages were not allowed; simple interest was regarded as adequate compensation. Id.
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lengthy appraisal process. This result is clearly inconsistent with the
purpose of the appraisal statutes which is to guarantee the dissenting
shareholder the fair value for his shares and to encourage the corpo-
ration to make a fair settlement offer.' 22 Finally, during the pendency
of the appraisal proceeding the dissenting shareholder is precluded
from other investment opportunities. The appraisal award should
thus recognize this fact by including fair interest compounded period-
ically. Only in this way will the compensatory character of the award
be recognized. 129
Upon judgment, the appraisal action is over and other rules of
recovery govern. Regardless of what rate the court applies during the
appraisal period, once judgment has been entered, the dissenter is
additionally entitled to only the judgment or legal rate of interest.' 3"
This rate will, however, be applied on the entire award, including the
fair value of the shares, the interest thereon, and the recoverable fees
and expenses.
VI. WHO DETERMINES THE INTEREST AWARD?
Several appraisal statutes"' include a provision similar to that of
the Model Act, which provides that "Rifle court may, if it so elects,
appoint one or more persons as appraisers to receive evidence and
recommend a decision on the question of fair value."' 32 Some statutes
provide that the court must appoint a specified number of
appraisers," 3 while others provide that the court itself must deter-
mine•the value of the shares and no provision is made for the ap-
pointment of appraisers.' 34
The findings of appraisers, however, are subject to judicial re-
view whether their appointment is mandatory or discretionary 15 This
review is based on the legislative mandate to include "an allowance for
interest at such rate as the court may find to be fair and equitable in all
" 9 See text at notes I-11 supra.
"9 In determining a "fair and equitable rate" at which to compound interest, the
court or appraiser can consider whether delays which have drawn out the appraisal
were caused by the dissenter or the corporation. See text at notes 91-93.
130 See note 20 supra.
1 " See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-373 (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1515 (Supp. 1974-75); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.72 (Supp. 1974-75).
lag ABA-ALI MODEI. Bus. CORP. Acr § 81 (1974).
'" E.g., DEL. Comm ANN. tit. 8, 262 (1974) (one appraiser); Mu. ANN. CODE art.
23, 73 (1973) (three appraisers). Four states require three appraisers, one chosen by
the corporation, one by the dissenting shareholder and the third chosen by the other
two appraisers. IDAHO CODE § 30-150 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301-40 (1969); N.H.
REV. STNr. ANN. § 294:77 (1966); Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. I I, § 2004 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
134 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21 (62) (Cum. Supp. 1974); D.C. CODE ENCVCL ANN.
§ 29-927i (1966). 	 •
'" E.g., Martignette v. Sagamore Mfg, Co., 340 Mass. 136, 138, 163 N.E.2d 9, 10
(1959).
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the circumstances ... "130 There is, at present, no authority for com-
plete delegation to appraisers of the power to determine interest re-
covery, and judicial review or determination on the question of in-
terest is universally in order.
However, the special expertise of the appraisers is recognized,
and a presumption in favor of their determination arises, provided
that it is in accordance with the statutory commands."' As a result,
"courts have been reluctant to disturb appraisers' findings unless the
figures are arbitrary or based on unreasonable premises."'" The ap-
praisers are closest to the parties and thus it would appear that they
are the best judges as to the rate at which interest should he
all owed. ' ""
Thus, the appraiser can determine (I) whether interest will be al-
lowed, (2) the rate of interest, and (3) whether interest should be sim-
ple or compound. Appraisers are competent to determine this latter
issue since it, in effect, constitutes a rate determination. As noted
above, it is wise for the dissenting shareholder to set forth in the rec-
ord all the equitable factors working in his favor, together with in-
fOrmation regarding what he considers the proper rate."" This in-
formation not only aids the appraiser in his determination, but also
helps to subsequently justify a favorable determination by the ap-
praiser.
VII. SUGGESTED STATUTORY LANGUAGE REGARDING INTEREST RECOVERY
IN APPRAISAL ACTIONS
In many states, it has been established by statute that a dissenter
is entitled to interest on his appraisal award."' However, there is still
room for confusion in these states as to the details of the interest to
which the dissenter is entitled. In addition, there are still several states
which make no provision at all for interest in their appraisal
statutes.' 42 For these reasons, the following statutory language is sug-
gested which provides for interest and clarifies the details of the in-
terest award. The suggested language is based on section 81 of the
Model Act.' 4 " The changes to the Act are italicized.
[ I] The court may, if it so elects, appoint one or more per-
'" ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Act . § 81 (1974) (emphasis added). See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, 262(h) (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(h)(6) (1963).
137 American Gen. Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629, 640, 190 A. 225, 230 (1937). See
Comment, 55 Mien. L. REV. 689, 695-96 (1957).
133 Note, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1453, 1454 (1966).
"" CJ: id. at 1454.
' 40 See text at notes 121-23 supra.
"' See text at notes 46-49 supra.
"2 See text at note 50 supra.
"3 The Model Act has been chosen because twenty-live states have adopted it in
substance and "it has become a major point of reference in the continuing revision of
state corporation acts." Foreward to ABA-ALI MonEt. Bus. CORP. ACE (1974).
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sons as appraisers to receive evidence and recommend a
decision to the court on the questions of fair value, interest
recovery, and recovery of costs and expenses. The appraisers
shall have such power and authority as shall be specified in
the order of their appointment or an amendment thereof
[2] The judgment shall in all cases include an allowance for
interest computed on the fair value as determined above, at such
rate set and compounded as the court may find to be fair and
equitable in all the circumstances, from the date on which
the vote was taken on the proposed corporate action to the
date of payment .... 144
The proposal grants the court authority to accept an appraiser's
decision regarding recovery of interest and reimbursement to either
party of any costs and expenses. The suggested revision further
specifies that the appraiser's function is only to receive evidence and
recommend a decision to the court, which then becomes by statute the
final arbiter on all questions. In no respect is the court bound by the
appraiser's findings.
The changes further provide for absolute recovery in all ap-
praisal actions of interest on the fair value of the shares from the date
of the shareholder vote authorizing the corporate change. This would
eliminate any uncertainty regarding recovery of interest, even if the
shareholder has in bad faith refused the corporation's initial settle-
ment offer. The court can compensate the corporation for such abuse
of the appraisal process by setting a low interest rate or by assessing
against the dissenter the expenses and fees incurred in the appraisal.
Furthermore, the suggested provision specifically permits the court to
allow compound interest recovery, which is very important if the ap-
praisal is drawn out over a lengthy period.
CONCLUSION
Appraisal can be considered an economic substitute for the
stock exchange. 145 Its function is to provide a method through which
a dissatisfied investor can get out of his corporate investment when he
has no other feasible way to do so. 146 However, the courts must pro-
In order to clarify the priority of the debt owed to the successful dissenter by
a corporation in the event of the insolvency of the latter, see note 83 supra, it is also
suggested that paragraph I of § 81 be amended as follows:
Any shareholder making such demand shall thereafter be a general
creditor of the rorporation after the date of such demand and be entitled only to
payments as in this section provided and shall not be thereafter entitled to
vote or to exercise any other rights of a shareholder, except such rights as
may be provided for in this section . .
"s Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE
L.J. 223, 261 (1962).
He ld.
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vide interest to a dissenter on his appraisal award, in recognition of
the fact that the corporation has had the use of the dissenter's money
for what may be a considerable period of time during which the
dissenter's investment fund has been sterilized. Otherwise, the cost of
appraisal might be too high for the ordinary investor 147 and dissenters
will have to acquiesce in the change or prematurely sell their shares
rather than wait to obtain the fair value through appraisal. Inequita-
ble treatment of minority shareholders would thus result. In addition,
low initial settlement offers and long delays in appraisal proceedings
would be to the advantage of the corporation if no interest must be
paid to the dissenter.
The mandate for interest recovery should be expressly set forth
by the legislature, on the theory that predictability of interest awards
would often promote out-of-court settlements. However, the court
must also be granted discretionary powers to adequately deal with the
interest issue. If the dissenter has unreasonably refused to accept a
settlement offer, the court, in its discretion could diminish his recov-
ery in its determination of the applicable rate of interest, and its de-
termination of whether that interest should be compounded. More
importantly, the court should possess the equitable power to assess
costs and expenses against a dissenter who unreasonably refuses a set-
tlement offer. It should be noted, however, that this assessment of
costs and expenses would, in most cases, be an alternative rather than
additional penalty for the bad faith pursuit of appraisal. Thus, in
those cases where the court does assess costs and expenses, this as-
sessment would usually be a sufficient penalty and interest on the ap-
praisal award should routinely be granted.
1f Sre text at notes 77-79 supra; SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGA-
TION OF THEWORK. ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL. AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND
REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES. pl. VII, at 590-604 (1938).
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